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THE COST OF LMNG: MARYLAND'S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE
THE WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSE OF ACTION SHORT-CHANGES
PLAINTIFFS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the earliest days of recorded history the mystery of human
existence has confounded philosophers, theologians, and every person who finds cause to examine their being. From such contemplation flows a myriad of puzzling questions, as deep and as wide as the
consciousness allows, begging consideration of when life begins and
ends, demanding reflection on life itself to determine the value of
existence. Without doubt, the answers are found individually, determined against the context of one's own existence, necessarily involving an evaluation drawing on the socioeconomic, moral,
philosophical and theological forces that shape the world. Yet, in a
civilized society, such individual metaphysical contemplation takes
place within, and is shaped by, a system of laws designed for application against the conduct of the masses.
In the microcosm of medical malpractice tort law, the intersections
of self-determination with prevailing legal principles present theoretical dilemmas for courts of law. One such dilemma is whether or not a
claim for wrongful life is valid. 1 Determination of this issue calls for a
headfirst dive into a quagmire filled with questions concerning fetal
rights, surrogate decision-making, and liability for negligent conduct. 2
The social underpinnings associated with a cause of action for wrongful life create a judicial reticence, resulting in a majority view that is
weakened by a lack of uniformity and a minority view that stretches
traditional tort theories to extend economic relief, acknowledging the
burdensome expense of an impaired existence. 3
Absent authority from the United States Supreme Court, states are
left to develop their own body of jurisprudence in accordance with
the statutory scheme in place within each jurisdiction, and any relevant common law precedent. This comment examines Maryland's
treatment of the wrongful life cause of action as addressed by that
jurisdiction for the first time in Kassama v. Magat. 4 Part II reviews the
evolution of wrongful life and other related causes of action, the treatment of wrongful life claims in other jurisdictions, and the common
1.
2.
3.
4.

See infra Part ILA.
See infra Part ILA-B.
See infra Part II.B.
136 Md. App. 637, 767 A.2d 348 (2001), affd, 368 Md. 113, 792 A.2d 1102
(2002) .
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law and statutory scheme in place in Maryland. Part III focuses on the
facts and legal doctrine involved in Kassama v. Magat, analyzes the relevant precedent and statutes, and addresses tort principles applied to
medical malpractice claims under Maryland law. Part IV of the comment considers the need for post-majority damages, evaluates arguments, for and against recognition of wrongful life claims, and
concludes that Maryland's refusal to recognize the wrongful life cause
of action leaves plaintiffs with a theoretical claim, yet no remedy at
law.

II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Overview oj Wrongful Life and Related Causes oj Action

Sounding in medical malpractice tort law,s wrongful life is a cause
of action brought on behalf of a child plaintiff seeking damages on a
theory that, but for the negligence 6 of a medical provider, the child
would not have been born. 7 This cause of action parallels a more
widely recognized 8 cause of action owned by the patents of a child
born as a result of the negligence of the medical provider, termed
wrongful birth. 9 The controversy surrounding these claims is that the
theory for recovery stands on the supposition that the parents would
rather terminate the pregnancy than run the risk of giving birth to a
defective child. 10
Other related causes of action, such as wrongful conception 11 and
wrongful diagnosis,12 add to the body of jurisprudence that precipitates claims for wrongful lifeP Yet, the United States Supreme
5. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811 (NY. 1978).
6. The negligence giving rise to wrongful life or wrongful birth claims generally arises from a lack of full disclosure of the various risks associated with
pregnancy, when such failure deprives the parents of the choice to terminate the pregnancy. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 955 (Cal. 1982);
Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760 (NJ. 1984); Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 80809.
7. Michael A. Berenson, Comment, The Wrongful Life Claim-The Legal Dilemma of Existence Versus Nonexistence: "To Be or Not To Be, " 64 TuL. L. REv.
895,897 (1990).
8. See Kassama v. Magat, 136 Md. App. 637, 665, 767 A.2d 348, 363 (2001);
Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Mass. 1990).
9. See Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 228, 630 A.2d 1145, 1146 (1993);
Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 487 (Wash. 1983).
10. See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 810.
11. Id. (explaining that a wrongful conception claim occurs when "parents, one
of whom has undergone an unsuccessful surgical birth control procedure,
have sought damages for the birth of an unplanned child").
12. Id. at 811 (explaining that a wrongful diagnosis claim occurs when the birth
of a child is attributable to a "wrongful diagnosis" of an existing pregnancy,
"resulting in the deprivation of the mother's choice to terminate the pregnancy within the permissible time period").
13. This comment does not consider wrongful birth, wrongful conception or
wrongful diagnosis at length.

2002]

The Cost of Living

99

Court's decision in Roe v. Wade l4 provides the impetus for pregnancy
and birth-related causes of action through the protection of abortion,15 creating an option for parents of would-be birth defective children to terminate the pregnancy,16 avoiding considerable financial
expense and emotional distress. 17 In addition, advancements in genetic counseling enable determination of the likelihood of delivering
a birth defective child; in utero diagnosis of genetic defects; and the
potential to treat and correct genetic defects during pregnancy. 18
Against this backdrop, courts now must confront the validity of the
wrongful life cause of action.
B.

Split of Authority

The law of prenatal torts has evolved rapidly since the decision in
Roe. 19 To date, a significant majority of jurisdictions, twenty-eight
~tates,20 do not recognize wrongful life as a valid cause of action. 21
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. Id.; see also Kassama v. Magat, 368 Md. 113, 134-35, 792 A.2d 1102, 1115
(2002).
16. See Procanik, 478 A.2d at 759 ("Relying on Roe v. Wade . .. the Court found
that public policy now supports the right of a woman to choose to terminate a pregnancy.") (citations omitted) (discussing Berman v. Allan, 80 NJ.
421 (1979)); see also Bernadette Kennedy, Comment, The Trend Toward Judicial Recognition of Wrongful Life: A Dissenting View, 31 UClA L. REv. 473, 49091 (1983) (discussing the public policy change resulting from Roe v. Wade).
17. See Procanik, 478 A.2d at 759.
18. See Thomas A. Warnock, Comment, Scientific Advancements: Will Technology
Make the Unpopular Wrongful Birth/Life Causes of Action Extinct?, 19 TEMP.
ENVTL. L & TECH. J. 173, 184 (2001); see also Susan Jenks, In Utero Gene
Therapy Is Still a Distant Promise, 91 J. NAT'L CANCER INsT. 829, 830 (1999).
19. See Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 231, 630 A.2d 1145, 1147 (1993);
Kassama v. Magat, 136 Md. App. 637, 665, 767 A.2d 348, 363 (2001); Vicarro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, lO (Mass. 1990); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 487 (Wash. 1983); see also Berenson, supra note 7, at 897;
see also supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
20. Kassama, 368 Md. at 137, 792 A.2d at 1116 (explaining that eighteen states
invalidate wrongful life through case law and ten states proscribe the claim
by statute).
21. See Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Walker by Pizano v. Mart,
790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo.
1988); Garrison v. Medical Ctr. of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288 (Del. 1989); Kush
v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho
1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987);
Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1991); Bruggeman v.
Schimke, 718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 517 So.
2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1987), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8 (Mass. 1990);
Strohmaier v. Assocs. in Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 332 N.W.2d 432
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1988); Greco
v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341
(N.H. 1986); Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 807; Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d
528 (N.C. 1985); Flanagan v. Williams, 623 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993); Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986); Nelson v. Krusen, 678
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Over the past twenty years, eight state legislatures acted to proscribe
wrongful life as a cause of action. 22 Representing the minority, three
states allow recovery for wrongful life at common law. 23 Of the three
states in the minority, two have enacted legislation acknowledging the
validity of the wrongful life cause of action. 24
1.

Majority View

Though facially the weight of authority falls heavily against recognizing wrongful life, a more critical examination reveals a majority
weakened by reliance on flawed public policy considerations due to a
consistent lack of solid rationale. 25 Analysis under the traditional tort
framework 26 primarily challenges proponents of wrongful life claims
to establish the legitimacy of the elements of causation and damages. 27 Moreover, in the context of wrongful life, the judiciary acknowledges the limitations of applying traditional legal principles to
theories of recovery so closely tied to public policy. 28

22.

23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.w.2d 372
(Wis. 1975); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
See IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (Michie 2000) (enacted 1985); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-12-1-1 (Michie 2001) (adopted 1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24
§ 2931 (West 2000) (invalidating wrongful life cause of action when child is
born healthy); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 600.2971 (West 2001); MINN.
STAT. § 145.424 (West 2000) (effective 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130
(West 2000) (enacted 1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-43 (2001) (adopted
1985); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8305(B) (West 2001) (effective 1988); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws § 21-55-1 (Michie 2001) (effective 1981); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-11-24 (2001) (adopted 1983).
See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 960; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 760; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at
486.
In 1981, California enacted section 43.6 of its civil code, which bars a cause
of action against a parent for wrongful life. Additionally, the statute denies
the failure to prevent the live birth of a child as a defense against third
parties, and from consideration in damage awards. CAL. Crv. CODE § 43.6
(West 2001). The Turpin court noted that the purpose of the legislation was
to "eliminate any liability or other similar economic pressure which might
induce potential parents to abort or decline to conceive a potentially defective child." Turpin, 643 P.2d at 959. In the state of Washington, though not
expressly addressed by statute, the validity of the wrongful life cause of action at common law is acknowledged in the annotations of its revised code.
Such sections include; section 7.70.040, which outlines the elements
needed to prove injury resulting from a breach of the duty of care, section
7.70.050, which addresses elements of proof in an action for lack of informed consent, and section 4.24.290, which codifies the standard of proof
in an action for damages on a theory of professional negligence.
See supra note 2l.
See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 811. Duty, breach, causation and injury comprise
the elements of the traditional tort framework utilized by the courts surveyed. Id.
See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 810. Noting that:
It borders on the absurdly obvious to observe that resolution of
[the wrongful life] question transcends the mechanical application
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Jurisdictions adopting the majority position point to three areas of
weakness within the tort framework of a plaintiff's cause of action for
wrongful life. Varied in accordance with each state's own common
law,29 courts place weight on lack of causation,30 absence of a legal
injury,3] and the impossibility of calculating damages,32 individually or
in combination, to invalidate wrongful life as a cause of action. 33
The interdependence of the elements involved in the tort framework blurs analysis when applied to wrongful life causes of action.
Stymied by the weakness of theoretical injuries,34 some courts stop
short of contemplating damages, resting on the lack of causation as
the basis for invalidating the plaintiff's cause of action. 35 These jurisdictions acknowledge the existence of the child as a result of the physician's negligence only inasmuch as the parents' wrongful birth claim
is concerned. 36 Analysis of the child's claim, however, shifts scrutiny
to the cause of the child's impairment, not the child's existence. 37
Whereas in a claim for wrongful birth, parents may recover for the
expense associated with raising a genetically defective child where the
of legal principles. Any such resolution, whatever it may be, must
invariably be colored by notions of public policy, the validity of
which remains, as always, a matter upon which reasonable men
may disagree.
[d.
29. See Pitre, 517 So. 2d at 1022-23; Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 682-84
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Procanik, 478 A.2d at 758-60.
30. See Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1329 ("The condition was caused not by another, but
by natural processes.") (emphasis omitted); see also Garrison, 581 A.2d at
288; James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985).
31. See Elliott, 361 So. 2d at 548; Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990);
Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1210; Garrison, 581 A.2d at 293; Blake, 698 P.2d at 322;
Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 700; Cowe, 575 N.E.2d at 635; Pitre, 517 So. 2d at
1024-25; Smith, 513 A.2d at 355; Flanagan, 623 N.E.2d at 191; Nelson, 678
S.w.2d at 925; Beardsley, 650 P.2d at 290.
32. Strohmaier, 332 N.W.2d at 435; Wilson, 751 S.W.2d at 743 (quoting Martin A.
Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth,
14 FAM. L.Q. 15, 40 (1980), and Thomas Rogers III, Wrongful Life and
Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing,
33 S.C. L. REv. 713, 729-30 (1982»; Greco, 893 P.2d at 347; Becker, 386
N.E.2d at 807; Dumer, 233 N.W.2d at 376.
33. See Garrison, 581 A.2d at 293-94; James G. v. Coserta, 332 S.E.2d 872,879-81
(W. Va. 1985).
34. Garrison, 581 A.2d at 294 ("We concur with the view that the question of
whether it would have been better for an impaired child to never have lived
at all is a philosophical one not amenable to judicial resolution.").
35. [d. at 293 ("There may be a causal link between defendants' negligence and
the child's existence, but not between that negligence and her impaired
condition."); Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1329 ("The condition ... was inflicted upon
the plaintiff not by any person, but by the plaintiff's genetic constitution .... The condition was caused not lJy another, but by natural processes.").
36. For wrongful birth, the cause of injury is the doctor's negligence that strips
the parents of their right to choose, thereby causing the child to come into
existence. See Berenson, supra note 7, at 899; see also Garrison, 581 A.2d at
290; Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1329-30.
37. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

102

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 32

injury stems from the negligence of the physician; jurisdictions not
recognizing wrongful life, however, create an illogical scenario in
which a child may not recover on the same facts as her parents. Thus,
the two claims are distinguished more so on damages than
causation. 38
A more solid rationale employed by many jurisdictions invalidates
wrongful life due to the absence of a legally cognizable injury.39 Most
courts do not acknowledge a legal right to be born. 40 Thus, those
courts hold that without a right to be born, the child cannot suffer an
injury from birthY This syllogism bears out the child's inability to
"prove injury at the hands of the doctor," by recognizing that
"[c]hildren ... have neither the ability nor the right to determine
questions of conception, termination of gestation, or carrying to
term."42 The strength of this position flows from the theoretical inability to recognize a right to be born without invading upon, or invalidating, a mother's autonomy in determining reproductive matters. 43
True examination of the issue, however, cannot stop here. Due to
advancements in medicine and the corresponding rise in the standard
of care owed to patients, once born, a right to access the courts inures
in the child, thus enabling a child plaintiff to take action against a
negligent tortfeasor. 44 Such is the case in Maryland, where claims by
minor plaintiffs arising from birth-related matters are recognizable at
common law. 45
The theoretical undoing of the wrongful life cause of action within
the traditional tort framework culminates in the inability of courts to
adequately determine the amount of damage incurred. 46 At bottom,
the plaintiff's claim is premised on the assertion that, but for the doctor's negligence, the child would not have been born and therein
would not "experience the pain and suffering attributable to" life with
38. See Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
39. See supra note 31.
40. Beardsley, 650 P.2d at 289. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)

(implying no right to be born).
41. Beardsley, 650 P.2d at 289.
42. Walker, 790 P.2d at, 740 (Ariz. 1990).
43. See Hon. George A. Brown, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort-An Introduction,
15 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 445, 447 (1981) (discussing conflict and confusion
between claims for wrongful life and wrongful birth). Legal theory precludes the concurrent recognition of both a right to be born and a right to
an abortion. For, if a right to be born is recognized, and a pregnancy is
aborted, a legal wrong occurs for which a cause of action inures in the
unborn child.
44. See Damasiecwicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 441, 79 A.2d 550, 561 (1951).
45. See Kassama v. Magat, 368 Md. 113,134,792 A.2d 1102, 1114 (2002); see also
Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 119,453 A.2d 1198, 1207
(1983); State v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 184, 198 A.2d 71, 73 (1964);
Damasiecwicz, 197 Md. at 439, 79 A.2d at 560.
46. See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812.

2002]

The Cost of Living

103

the genetic defect. 47 Thus, the determination of an award "demands
a calculation of damages dependent upon a comparison between the
Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence."48
At this point, some courts find themselves afloat in a tumultuous sea
of countervailing policy considerations that motivate the judiciary to
abandon the search for a legal remedy, deferring resolution of the
matter to the legislature. 49 Foremost in the mind of the judiciary
seems to be the public policy supporting the preciousness of human
life. 50 The sanctity of life argument packages the notion that life, in
any condition or form, holds intrinsic value. 51 Other policy considerations include the public perception, sensitivity to and treatment of defective humans,52 as well as line-drawing considerations. 53

2.

Minority View

At least three states, California, Washington and New Jersey, have
recognized wrongful life as a valid cause of action, albeit in a limited
form. 54 These jurisdictions modify the tort analysis, only allowing re47. Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 638 (Kan. 1986).
48. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812.
49. See, e.g., Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 702; Cowe, 575 N.E.2d at 635; Pitre, 517 So.
2d at 1025.
50. Bruggeman, 718 P.2d at 639-40 ("Basic to our culture is the precept that life
is precious. As a society, therefore, our laws have as their driving force the
purpose of protecting, preserving and improving the quality of human existence.") (quoting Blake, 698 P.2d at 322).
51. See Bruggeman, 718 P.2d at 640 ("life - whether experienced with or without
a major physical handicap - is more precious than non-life") (quoting
Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8,12 (NJ. 1979»; see also Flanagan, 623 N.E.2d
at 191.
52. See Smith, 513 A.2d at 353 (quoting Geoffrey D. Minnot & Vincent P.
Zurzolo, Comment, Wrongful Life: A Misconceived Tort, 15 V.C. DAVIS L. REv.
447,459-60 (1981) (footnotes omitted». The court noted:
[Disabled persons] also face subtle yet equally devastating handicaps in the attitudes and behavior of society, the law, and their own
families and friends. Furthermore, society often views disabled persons as burdensome misfits. Recent legislation concerning employment, education, and building access reflects a slow change in
these attitudes. This change evidences a growing public awareness
that the handicapped can be valuable and productive members of
society.
Smith, 513 A.2d at 353.
53. In Siemieniec, the court noted:
Judges and juries will have to determine the degree of impairment
that renders a child's nonexistence preferable to existence. Not
only will such a judgment be unpalatable, but persons making this
judgment can look only to their own feelings or fears of being
handicapped in deciding the merits of the claim.
Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 699-700.
54. See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 954; see also Procanik, 478 A.2d at 755; Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
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covery of special damages related to the extraordinary cost of medical
care attributable to the malady. 55
Adherence to the core principles of tort law enables the minority
jurisdictions to rebut the policy considerations to which the majority
of jurisdictions ultimately succumbed. 56 The wrongful life cause of
action flows from the acceptance at common law of the premise that
the duty of care owed by a physician extends to the fetus. 57 In assessing the existence of a legal injury and the extent of damages, a minority of courts agree with the premise underlying the majority's denial of
the cause of action, that "measuring the value of an impaired life as
compared to nonexistence is a task that is beyond mortals, whether
judges or jurors."58 Yet, the minority courts each determine that the
inability to assess general damages is not fatal. 59 Thus, the minority
allows the plaintiff child to recover only those special damages attributable to the extraordinary cost of her affliction. 60 Special damages are
quantifiable 61 and allow the courts to vindicate the "dual objectives of
[the] tort system: the compensation of injured parties and the deterrence of future wrongful conduct."62 Furthermore, these courts limit
the recovery of such damages to a single plaintiff,63 acknowledging
the possibility that the child's parents mayor may not be available to
recover for pre-majority damages. 64
C.

Maryland Common Law Recognizes Wrongful Conception and Wrongful
Birth Claims

The common law landscape in Maryland includes prenatal tort
claims for wrongful conception 65 and wrongful birth.66 Critical analy55. Turyin, 643 P.2d at 966; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 757; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 497.
56. See Turyin, 643 P.2d at 965-66; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 495-96.
57. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 760 ("[TJhe defendant doctors do not deny they owed
a duty to the infant plaintiff, and we find such a duty exists."); Harbeson, 656
P.2d at 495 ("Prenatal injuries to a fetus have been recognized as actionable
in this state for 20 years .... We now hold ... a duty may extend to persons
not yet conceived .... "); see also Turyin, 643 P.2d at 960.
58. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496.
59. Turyin, 643 P.2d at 963 (addressing the extent of damages from a practical
standpoint, by denying only general damages due to the impossibility to
rationally determine if a child indeed suffered an injury in being born impaired instead of not being born at all, and due to the lack of "any fair,
nonspeculative" method of calculating general damages); Procanik, 478
A.2d at 763 (focusing solely on the "needs of the living" instead of being
stymied by the "philosophical problem of finding that such a defective life
is worth less than no life at all"); Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496.
60. See Turyin, 643 P.2d at 965; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at
496-97.
61. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762.
62. [d. at 764.
63. See id. at 762.
64. Turyin, 643 P.2d at 965; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762.
65. Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
66. Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 630 A.2d 1145 (1993).
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sis of the evolution of these related causes of action in Maryland
reveals tort principles and policy considerations relied upon by the
judiciary.67
.
l.

Prenatal Injuries

Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch marks the genesis of the common law regarding prenatal injuries in Maryland. 68 In that case, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that a child injured prior to birth may maintain an
action for damages against the negligent party.69 To arrive at this decision, the court studied the early common law of England and Ireland regarding the right to inherit legal claims, and whether or not
legal rights inure in unborn children for the purposes of tort actions,
and if so, at what point. 70 The court then turned to a survey of similar
claims adjudicated in other jurisdictions within the United States. 71
Confronted with authority on either side, the court categorized the
cases as adhering to either the position implied by Lord Coke or an
alternate stance that relies on advances in medical science and general knowledge. The first position acknowledges the inheritance of
legal rights in children after birth, while the latter uses medical science
and general knowledge in determining a prenatal right of action. 72
Before determining the issue, the court dismissed lesser arguments
attacking recognition of a child's legal claim for prenatal injuries on
the basis that medical science will divine baseless claims from the legitimate, and will necessarily weigh on the ability of plaintiffs to prove
their claim. 73 Breaking free from an antiquated majority position,14
the Court of Appeals of Maryland approached the issue in terms of
rights; accepting the argument that the "child does not continue until
birth to be a part of its mother," and as such has independent rights,
inuring upon viability and exercisable at birth.75 Thus, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, reversing the trial court, held that a child has
the right to sue for injuries suffered prior to birth. 76

2. Wrongful Conception
In Jones v. Malinowski, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized
a cause of action for the parents of a healthy child born as the result
67. See Reed, 332 Md. at 232-35, 630 A.2d at 1148; Jones, 299 Md. at 263-70, 473
A.2d at 432-35.
68. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
69. See id. at 435-41, 79 A.2d at 557-61.
70. Id. at 419-25, 79 A.2d at 550-53.
71. Id. at 425-36, 79 A.2d at 553-58.
72. See id. at 436-37, 79 A.2d at 559.
73. See id. at 437, 79 A.2d at 559.
74. See Damasiewicz, 197 Md. at 440, 79 A.2d at 560.
75. Id. at 441, 79 A.2d at 561.
76. See id.
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of a negligently performed sterilization procedure. 77 In so holding,
the court surveyed existing precedent in jurisdictions representing
both the majority7s and minority79 positions relative to the issue of
"whether the cause of action encompasses damages for the costs of
rearing the unplanned but healthy child to majority."so Thereafter,
the court examined applicable medical malpractice tort principles in
Maryland and the attendant policy considerations,s1 before adopting
the minority position,s2 allowing parents to recover damages for child
rearing costs through the age of majority, offset by the benefit derived
from the child's aid, society and comfort. s3

3.

Wrongful Birth

Building on the principles used in Jones, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland recognized a parent's cause of action for wrongful birth in
Reed v. Campagnolo.S4 As in Jones, the court analyzed each element of
the tort framework, reasoning from the jurisdiction's common law
and applicable statutes. S5 In considering the existence of a legal injury, the court relied upon precedent from prevailing jurisdictions,
bearing out competing policy arguments. S6 Furthermore, the court's
77. Jones, 299 Md. at 263,473 A.2d at 432. Mr. and Mrs. Malinowski had three
children, one by breech birth, the second born with a brain disease, and
the third born with a heart disease. Id. at 260, 473 A.2d at 430. Motivated
by financial difficulties and the trauma the couple experienced with childbirth, Mrs. Malinowski underwent a sterilization procedure called bipolar
tubal laparoscopy. Id. During the procedure, the physician cauterized the
wrong tissue, failing to block one of the Fallopian tubes. Id. Thus, the procedure was ineffective. Id. Mrs. Malinowski became pregnant a fourth time,
delivering a healthy child. Id.
78. Id. at 263-65, 473 A.2d at 432-33.
79. Id. at 265-68, 473 A.2d at 433-34.
80. Id. at 263, 473 A.2d at 432.
81. Id. at 268-71, 473 A.2d at 435-36.
82. Id. at 270,473 A.2d at 435.
83. Jones, 299 Md. at 270,473 A.2d at 435. See id. at 272-74,473 A.2d at 436-37,
for a discussion of the assessment of damages for child rearing costs offset
by the benefits rule.
84. 332 Md. 226, 240, 630 A.2d 1145, 1152 (1993). The Reeds were not informed by their medical provider of the "existence or need for routine [alpha-fetoprotein] ("AFP") testing" as a part of prenatal care. Id. at 229, 630
A.2d at 1146. The Reeds' child was born with spina bifida and other genetic abnormalities, which an AFP test would have detected. Id. at 229-30,
630 A.2d at 1146-47. Consequently, the Reeds were stripped of their ability
to choose to terminate the pregnancy. Id.
85. Id. at 232-40, 630 A.2d at 1148-52.
86. Id. at 235-39, 630 A.2d at 1149-51. When the court decided the issue of
whether to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth, the prevailing
arguments concerning the existence of a legal injury considered the economic impact of delivering and raising a child, healthy or not, on one side,
against the notion that life, under any circumstance, cannot be considered
a legal injury, on the other side. Id.
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broad view of proximate cause contributed to the validity of wrongful
birth claims in Maryland. 87
D.

Arguments Supported by the Statutory Scheme in Maryland

The statutory scheme and supporting common law in Maryland
provide a basis for recognizing wrongful life as a valid cause of action. 88 Section 20-209 of the Health-General Article of the Maryland
Code codifies Maryland's abortion law, a liberal statute 89 that does not
provide a time limitation for terminating a pregnancy if the fetus suffers from a "genetic defect or serious deformity or abnormality."90
Also relevant to the validity of wrongful life is the statutory obligation
imposed on the parents of destitute adult children to provide "food,
shelter, care and clothing,"91 an obligation enforceable by criminal
sanctions. 92 Beyond these statutory obligations, however, the common law does not extend primary responsibility for the adult child's
medical expenses to the parent. 93
87. Id. at 239-40, 630 A.2d 1151-52. The court relied upon a substantial factor
analysis of legal cause. See id. at 240, 630 A.2d at 1152; see also Kassama, 136
Md. App. at 658-63, 767 A.2d at 359-62 (discussing the issue of proximate
cause).
88. See infra notes 90-104, 153-54 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.
A-B.
89. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 646, 767 A.2d at 353.
90. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-209(b)(2)(ii) (2001). The pertinent
language reads:
(b) State inteIVention.-Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the State may not interfere with the decision of a woman to
terminate a pregnancy:
(1) Before the fetus is viable; or
(2) At any time during the woman's pregnancy, if:
(i) The termination procedure is necessary to protect the
life or health of the woman; or
(ii) The fetus is affected by genetic defect or serious deformity or abnormality.
Id.
91. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 13-102(b) (1999). The statute reads:
(b) Duty to support destitute adult child.-If a destitute adult child is
in this State and has a parent who has or is able to earn sufficient means, the parent may not neglect or refuse to provide
the destitute adult child with food, shelter, care, and clothing.
Id.
92. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 13-102(c) (1999 & Supp. 2002). The statute
reads:
(c) Penalties.-A person who violates any provision of this section is
. guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine
not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year,
or both.
Id.
93. See Pepper v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., III Md. App. 49, 70-71, 680 A.2d 532,
542-43 (1996), affd, 346 Md. 679, 697 A.2d 1358 (1997) (stating that "parents do not... have the primary responsibility for post-majority medical expenses of their children .... Section 13-102(b) of the Family Law Article
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Significant to the argument in favor of recognizing wrongful life is
the judicial interpretation of Section 13-102(b) of the Family Law Article in Pepper-v. Johns Hopkins Hospital. 94 Pepper involved a medical malpractice claim brought by a minor patient seeking, among other
things, to recover post-majority damages from a negligent medical
care provider. 95 Reasoning from their decision in Presley v. Presley96
and their interpretation of Section 13-102(b),97 the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland noted that parents are not "primarily liable for
the medical expenses of an adult child."98 The court's rationale relied
upon the ability of the tort system to vindicate the otherwise illogical
result that holds the potential to bankrupt a family due to their statutorily imposed responsibility for the expenses incurred by the incapacitated adult child due to "the negligence of a solvent third party."99
Furthermore, section 13-102(b) does not give rise to a cause of action
in favor of the parent against the negligent doctor. loo Thus, the rule

94.
95.
96.

97.
98.

99.

100.

places upon an adult child's parents a contingent responsibility for the
adult child's medical expenses if the adult child is destitute and cannot pay
them"). For a comprehensive history of the common law enforcement of
Section 13-102(b) of the Family Law Article, see Freeburgerv. Bichell, 135 Md.
App. 680, 763 A.2d 1226 (2000) (concluding that the parent of an injured
adult child did not establish that he was under a legal obligation to provide
for his son's medical care).
III Md. App. at 70-72,680 A.2d 542-43.
See id. at 56-60, 680 A.2d at 535-37. For a specific discussion regarding the
claim for post-majority medical expenses, see id. at 70-73, 650 A.2d at 54244.
65 Md. App. 265, 277-78, 500 A.2d 322, 328 (1985) ("The duty of support
arises when the child has insufficient resources and, because of mental or
physical infirmity, insufficient income capacity to enable him to meet his
reasonable living expenses. ").
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
Pepper, III Md. App. at 71-72,680 A.2d at 543. The court noted that "[a]n
adult child is primarily liable for his or her own medical expenses." [d. at
70, 680 A.2d at 542. In the case of a destitute adult child, however, Section
13-102(b) of the Family Law Article requires an adult child's parents to pay
medieal expenses if the adult is unable to pay. [d. at 71, 680 A.2d at 543.
[d. at 71-72, 680 A.2d at 543. The court stated:
Furthermore, the contingent responsibility would not normally be
expected to come into play if injury is caused by the negligence of a
solvent third party and if the tort system works as it should. Tort
recovery is designed, inter alia, to prevent an injured party from
becoming destitute and a burden upon innocent third parties.
[d. at 71,680 A.2d at 543; see also Hale v. State, 44 Md. App. 376, 378-79, 408
A.2d 772, 772-73 (1979) (holding that an adult child is liable under Article
27, section 104 only if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the parent was destitute, and that the adult child was "able to earn means sufficient" to support the parent); see also Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604,
611,479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984) (holding that a parent with the means to
do so, must support a destitute adult child whose disability commenced
after the age of majority).
Freeburger v. Biehell, 135 Md. App. 680, 682-83, 763 A.2d 1226, 1227
(2000) (involving a suit brought by the father of a destitute, disabled, adult
child against the tortfeasor responsible for the adult child's injuries).
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of Pepper clearly supports a cause of action that would enable a plaintiff child to recover for the extraordinary cost of medical care attendant with the injury suffered at the hands of a negligent medical
provider. IOI Reading Maryland's abortion law102 in co~unction with
section 13-102(b) and the supporting case law,103 a theory that would
enable a plaintiff child to recover post-majority damages to compensate for the extraordinary expense of medical care and maintenance
concomitant with her existence, a condition proximately caused by
the negligence of the medical provider,I04 becomes reasonable.

III.

A.

KASSAMA v. MAGAT: BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL
DOCTRINE
The Facts of Kassam a v. Magat

As a matter of first impression,105 the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland addressed a wrongful life claim brought by Milicent Kassarna ("Mrs. Kassama") on behalf of her daughter, Ibrion. 106 At the
same time, Mrs. Kassama brought her own claim for wrongful birth. 107
Both causes of action were based on negligence and lack of informed
consent. lOB
The facts giving rise to the litigation remained unsettled at trial, as
Mrs. Kassama and Dr. Magat disagreed as to the timing of critical
events. 109 According to Dr. Magat, Mrs. Kassama's obstetrician-gynecologist, Mrs. Kassama's initial appointment was April 19, 1995, at
which time an ultrasound test was performed revealing the age of her
fetus as seventeen weeks, four days.110 As such, Mrs. Kassama was
noted in the file as a "late registrant."l1l During the initial visit, Dr.
Magat "ordered blood work, including an AFP test." 11 2 Mrs. Kassama
was given a requisition slip and referred to a laboratory not far from
10l. Pepper, III Md. App. at 71, 680 A.2d at 543.
102. Supra note 90.
103. See supra notes 91, 93-100 and accompanying text.
104. In wrongful life claims, the injury complained of is life itself. See supra notes
5-7, 46-48 and accompanying text.
105. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 641, 767 A.2d at 350.
106. Id. at 643, 767 A.2d at 351.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 642-43, 767 A.2d at 35l.
109. See id. at 646-52, 767 A.2d at 353-56.
1l0. Id. at 646-47, 767 A.2d at 353.
lll. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 647, 767 A.2d at 353.
ll2. Id. at 646-47, 767 A.2d at 353. Alpha-fetoprotein "increases in maternal
blood during pregnancy and, when detected by amniocentesis, is an important indicator of open neural tube defects .... " STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIe.
TIONARY 637 (26th ed. 1995). An AFP test is a method of detecting the
potential for genetic defects in a fetus. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 644, 767
A.2d at 352. The test involves drawing and analyzing blood drawn from the
mother, generally fifteen to sixteen weeks into her pregnancy but as late as
nineteen weeks, to determine the level of alpha fetoprotein present. Id.
Unusually low scores are indicative of Down's syndrome. Id.
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the doctor's office where a blood sample would be drawn and analyzed. II3 Dr. Magat explained the purpose of the AFP test, when the
test should be performed, and discussed screenings for other potential maladies. 114 Dr. Magat told her to have the tests performed "as
soon as possible" and dated the requisition slip April 20, 1995, as he
expected the tests to be performed the next dayYs Mrs. Kassama was
given two additional slips, one of which was to be used for an official
ultrasound. I 16
Mrs. Kassama's next visit with Dr. Magat was May 18, 1995Y7 During the appointment, she told the doctor that the blood for the AFP
test was drawn May 16, 1995, prompting Dr. Magat to note on her
chart that the patient was "non-compliant."118 The lab results were
summarized in a report, which Dr. Magat reviewed on May 25,
1995.11 9 According to Dr. Magat, he then informed Mrs. Kassama by
phone that the test results indicated that she "had a one in fIfty-seven
chance of delivering a baby with Down's syndrome."120 At the time of
Dr. Magat's call, the gestational age of the fetus was twenty-two weeks,
four days.121
Evidence at trial established that no doctor in Maryland would perform an abortion of a fetus with Down's syndrome beyond twentythree weeks, six days.122 However, because AFP tests are not defInitive, amniocentesis was needed. 123 Dr. Magat testifIed that during a
phone conversation on May 25th, he told Mrs. Kassama that by the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

121.
122.
123.

Id. at 647, 767 A.2d at 353.
Id. at 647, 767 A.2d at 354.
Id. at 647, 767 A.2d at 353.
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 647, 767 A.2d at 353-54.
Id. at 647, 767 A.2d at 354.
Id. at 647-48, 767 A.2d at 354.
Id. at 648, 767 A.2d at 354.
Id. at 648-49, 767 A.2d at 354. Down's syndrome is defined as:
[A] chromosomal dysgenesis syndrome consisting of a variable constellation of abnormalities caused by triplication or translocation of
chromosome 21. The abnormalities include mental retardation,
retarded growth, flat hypoplastic face with short nose, prominent
epicanthic skin folds, small low-set ears with prominent antihelix,
fissured and thickened tongue, laxness of joint ligaments, pelvic
dysplasia, broad hands and feet, stubby fingers, and transverse palmar crease. Lenticular opacities and heart disease are common.
The incidence of leukemia is increased and Alzheimer's disease is
almost inevitable by age 40.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1728 (26th ed. 1995).
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 648, 767 A.2d at 354.
Id.
Id. at 644-45, 767 A.2d at 352. Amniocentesis is defined as
"[t]ransabdominal aspiration of fluid from the amniotic sac." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 62 (26th ed. 1995). Amniocentesis is a test conducted
to determine, with certainty, the genetic profile of a fetus. Kassama, 136
Md. App. at 644-45, 767 A.2d at 352. The test is usually performed subsequent to an AFP test that indicates an increased likelihood of genetic defects in the fetus. Id. Test results enable parents to adequately plan for or
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time an amniocentesis could have been performed, and the results
obtained, there would be insufficient time to schedule and perform
an abortion in Maryland. 124 Dr. Magat also testified that he informed
Mrs. Kassama of her option to obtain an abortion in other states. 125
Contrary to Dr. Magat's testimony, Mrs. Kassama testified that she
followed Dr. Magat's directions, undergoing an ultrasound on May 11,
1995, and having blood drawn May 16, 1995. 126 Furthermore, Mrs.
Kassama testified that the phone conversation on May 25th never happened, and that she was not informed of the AFP test results, the option of performing an amniocentesis, or an abortion. 127 Mrs. Kassama
further testified that had she been properly informed, she would have
obtained an amniocentesis, and if she had been certain that her fetus
had Down's syndrome, she would have obtained an abortion in Maryland or elsewhere. 128 Ibrion was born September 19, 1995, afflicted
with Down's syndrome. 129 Mrs. Kassama then filed suit in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County against Dr. Magat. 130

B.

Issues Presented by Kassama

Prior to trial, the defendant was granted partial summary judgment
as to Ibrion Kassama's claim of lack of informed consent. 131 At the
close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant's motion for judgment was
granted as to Ibrion's claim of negligence and Mrs. Kassama's claim of
lack of informed consent, leaving only the mother's wrongful birth
claim for the jury. 132 The jury determined that Dr. Magat had
breached the standard of care, and was, therefore, the proximate
cause of Mrs. Kassama's injury.133 The jury also determined, however,
that Mrs. Kassama was also negligent for her injury,134 and as such,
Mrs. Kassama's claim failed because Maryland courts bar recovery
when contributory negligence is present. 135

124.
125.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

prevent the birth of a genetically defective child. Id. at 645, 767 A.2d at
357.
See id. at 649, 767 A.2d at 354-55.
Id. Women can get an abortion in New York up to twenty-six weeks of gestational age and, for a Down's syndrome fetus, up to twenty-eight weeks in
Kansas. Id. at 650, 767 A.2d at 355. Testimony indicated Arkansas as an
out-of-state alternative, as well. See Kassama v. Magat, 368 Md. 113, 120, 792
A.2d 1102, 1106 (2002).
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 647-48, 652, 767 A.2d at 354, 356.
Id. at 652, 767 A.2d at 356.
Id.
Id. at 642, 767 A.2d at 351.
Id.
Id. at 643, 767 A.2d at 351.
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 643, 767 A.2d at 35l.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 657, 767 A.2d at 359 (quoting Batten v. Michel, 15 Md. App. 646,
652, 292 A.2d 707, 711 (1972»; see also Bd. of County Comm'rs of Garret
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On appeal, Mrs. Kassama raised several issues with respect to her
and lbrion's claims. 136 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed three of those issues: whether or not the trial court committed
error by allowing the jury to decide the issue of Mrs. Kassama's contributory negligence; if not, whether the trial court committed error
by not instructing the jury as to the last clear chance doctrine; and
whether the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for
judgment as to the plaintiff's wrongful life claim.137 The trial court
was affirmed on all three issues. 138 Not persuaded by the minority
position,139 the appellate court did not recognize the wrongful life
claim due to the impossibility of calculating damages. 14o
C.

Relevant Maryland Precedent

Due to the novelty of the wrongful life cause of action, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, when deciding Kassama, relied heavily
on persuasive primary authority and secondary sources. 141 However,
except for an introductory reference to the jurisdiction's recognition
of wrongful birth claims in Reed v. Campagnolo, the court did not consider any Maryland cases in the disposition of the wrongful life issue. 142 Furthermore, the court's sole statutory consideration focused
on Maryland's abortion law. 143

136.
137.

138.
139.
140.
141.

142.
143.

County Md. v. Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc., 346 Md. 160, 180,695 A.2d 171, 181
(1997) (discussing the doctrine of contributory negligence).
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 643, 767 A.2d at 351-52.
Id. at 643-44, 767 A.2d at 351-52. The court did not address three of the
questions presented by appellant. See id. The declined questions were:
1. Did the trial court err in excluding any evidence as to postmajority damages?
.
2. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury that any damages
suffered by Mrs. Kassama were to be offset by any non-eco-.
nomic benefit she suffered as a result of the birth of her
daughter?
3. Did the trial court err in allowing evidence of the availability of
public services in contravention of the collateral source rule?
Id. at 643, 767 A.2d at 352 n.5.
Id. at 644, 767 A.2d at 352.
See supra Part II.B.2.
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 675, 767 A.2d at 369.
See id. at 665-75, 767 A.2d at 363-69. The court began its analysis of the
wrongful life cause of action by providing an overview of traditional tort law
drawn from relevant scholarly writings. Id. at 665-66, 767 A.2d at 363-64.
The court then continued with an examination of the wrongful life cause of
action within the tort framework as demonstrated through precedent-setting cases from foreign jurisdictions. Id. at 666-68, 767 A.2d at 364-65. A
comprehensive survey of those jurisdictions that have addressed wrongful
life, including the majority and minority jurisdictions as well as those states
that have legislated to prohibit the cause of action, followed. Id. at 668-75,
767 A.2d at 365-69.
Id. at 665, 767 A.2d at 363.
Id. at 646, 767 A.2d at 353; see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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The court reviewed the prevailing rationale that disqualifies wrongful life claims premised on the absence of a legal injury,144 and the
impossibility of calculating damages,145 as well as arguments premised
on public policy considerations. 146 The court dismissed as flawed, the
minority position that limits recovery under wrongful life claims to
special damages. 147 Instead, the court, in a footnote, suggested that a
parent, through a wrongful birth cause of action, more properly will
recover damages under wrongful life, and if not, the state should support the minor. 148 Yet, this suggestion runs counter to the statutory
scheme advanced in Presley v. Presley149 and Pepper v. Johns Hopkins Hospital,150 a line of reasoning that was not discussed by the Kassama
court. 151
D.

Tort Principles as Applied to Medical Malpractice Claims in Maryland

Ultimately, recognition of prenatal torts relies on the satisfaction of
the elements of the traditional tort framework as applied to medical
malpractice claims in Maryland. 152 Consistency in the analysis of medical malpractice claims is crucial to the strength and validity of the
court's holding. 153 A review of Reed v. Campagnolo indicates that the
144. Id. at 666-67, 767 A.2d at 364. The court discussed Ellis v Sherman, 515
A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986), in which a wrongful life claim was rejected due to the
inability of the plaintiff to prove an injury. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 666,
767 A.2d at 364. The Ellis court noted, "the condition was caused not by
another, but by natural processes. It is not, therefore a legal injury." Id. at
667,767 A.2d at 364 (quoting Ellis, 515 A.2d at 1329).
145. Id. at 667, 767 A.2d at 364. The court agreed with the reasoning of Becker v.
Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978), that a comparison between an impaired life and nonexistence places the calculation of damages outside the
ability of the judiciary, thereby frustrating tort principles designed to "put
the victim ... in the position that he would have been in if the defendant
had not been negligent." Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 667-68, 767 A.2d at 36465.
146. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 669, 767 A.2d at 365. The court noted certain
jurisdictions that reject the wrongful life cause of action due to the
"preciousness of human life." Id.
147. Id. at 672-73, 767 A.2d at 367. The court was unimpressed by the inability
of California, Washington and New Jersey to explain the process that denies general damages yet allows special damages. Id. at 675, 767 A.2d at
369.
148. Id. at 673 n.19, 767 A.2d at 368 n.19.
149. 65 Md. App. 265, 500 A.2d 322 (1985); see supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
150. III Md. App. 49, 680 A.2d 532 (1996); see supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
151. See generally Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 637, 767 A.2d at 348.
152. Id. at 673, 767 A.2d at 367-68; see also Weimer v. Hetrick, 309 Md. 536, 54649,525 A.2d 643,648-50 (1987); Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda, 255 Md.
616,621-22,258 A.2d 595, 598 (1969).
153. See Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 672-73, 767 A.2d at 367. In analyzing the
validity of the wrongful life cause of action under the tort framework, the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland preyed on the failure of the Turpin
court to "account fully and consistently for the fundamental flaw of the
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Maryland court of appeals' analysis of the wrongful life cause of action
may conform to the application of medical malpractice tort principles
used when that court confronted wrongful conception and wrongful
birth claims. 154
Maryland's medical malpractice tort law supports a comprehensive
standard of care, which describes the duty a physician owes to a patient. 155 As developed through the common law, the duty of a physician to a patient also extends to the unborn child. 156 As applied to
the facts at issue in Kassama, and in accordance with the defendant's
own testimony, if the trier of fact believed Mrs. Kassama's version of
events-that she was not informed of the results of the AFP test or of
her options to terminate the pregnancy-the defendant would have
breached the duty of care. 157
Following a breach of the duty of care, the plaintiff must then establish that such a breach caused, or proximately caused, the injury suffered. 158 Maryland views this element broadly, employing the
"substantial factor" test to determine causation. 159 When viewed from
the plaintiff child's position in a wrongful life claim, arguments purporting to establish causation, injury and damages are tenuous. 160
The "substantial factor" analysis, however, enables the court to satisfy
causation by recognizing the ability of the physician to circumvent liability through proper execution of the physician's duty.161

154.

155.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
16l.

wrongful life claim-the inability to make the required comparison between the plaintiffs actual condition and nonexistence." [d. (quoting Kurtis J. Kearl, Turpin v. Sortini: Recognizing the Unsupportable Cause of Action for
Wrongful Life, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1278 (1983».
Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 232, 630 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1993). The
Court of Appeals of Maryland demonstrates the need for consistency by
adhering to the same tort principles applied in Jones v. Malinowski, when
deciding whether or not to recognize wrongful birth claims in Reed v.
Campagnolo. [d.
As described by the court in Reed:
A physician is under a duty to use that degree of care and skill
which is expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the
same class to which he belongs, acting in the same or similar circumstances. Under this standard, advances in the profession, availability of facilities, specialization or general practice, proximity of
specialists and special facilities, together with all other relevant
considerations, are to be taken into account.
Reed, 332 Md. at 233,630 A.2d at 1148 (quoting Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp., 276 Md. 187,200-01,349 A.2d 245, 253 (1975».
Reed, 332 Md. at 233, 630 A.2d at 1148 (quoting Suburban Hosp. Ass'n v.
Mewhinney, 230 Md. 480, 484-85, 187 A.2d 671, 673 (1963».
Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 650, 767 A.2d at 355.
Reed, 332 Md. at 232-33, 630 A.2d at 1148.
[d. at 240, 630 A.2d at 1152. Negligent conduct is the legal cause of injury if
it is a "substantial factor" and the actor is not relieved from liability by rule
of law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
See supra Part II.B.2.
See Reed, 332 Md. at 241,630 A.2d at 1152 (quoting Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md.
432,438-39,379 A.2d, 1014, lO19 (1977) for the proposition that "the doc-

2002]

The Cost of Living

115

Turning to the determination of damages, Maryland common law
recognizes, as a general rule, that "a plaintiff may recover only those
damages that are affirmatively proved with reasonable certainty to
have resulted as the natural, proximate and direct effect of the tortious misconduct."162 Maryland employs two principles, the doctrine
of avoidable consequences 163 and the benefit-offset rule,164 in the determination of recoverable damages. 165 As a matter of public policy
and logic, the former is unlikely to bear on the calculation of damages
in the context of a wrongful life claim. 166 Yet, as demonstrated by
certain jurisdictions adopting the majority position, special benefits
conferred upon the plaintiff by the defendant's negligent conduct,
namely the preciousness of life, may be considered in offsetting, or
more to the extreme, nullifying, recoverable damages. 167
Furthermore, the purpose underlying the tort system of recovery is
the notion that damages should be designed with the intention of restoring the injured party to the condition they would experience, but
for the negligence of the tortfeasor. 168 Falling in line with the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed wrongful life claims, the Court

162.
163.

164.

165.
166.

167.

168.

trine of informed consent imposes on a physician ... the duty to explain
the procedure to the patient and to warn him of any material risks or dangers inherent in or collateral to the therapy, so as to enable the patient to
make an intelligent and informed choice.").
Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 269, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (1984).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 918 explains the doctrine of avoidable consequences as follows:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), one injured by the tort of
another is not entitled to recover damages for any harm that
he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the tort.
(2) One is not prevented from recovering damages for a particular
harm resulting from a tort if the tortfeasor intended the harm
or was aware of it and was recklessly disregardful of it, unless
the injured person with knowledge of the danger of the harm
intentionally or heedlessly failed to protect his own interests.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1965).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 920 explains the benefit offset rule
as follows:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special
benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of
the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to
the extent that this is equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1965).
Jones, 299 Md. at 269, 473 A.2d at 435.
See id. at 274, 473 A.2d at 437-38 (denying Dr. Jones' contentions that
under the doctrine of avoidable consequences Mrs. Malinowski refusal to
submit to an abortion, or place her daughter up for adoption should be
considered when mitigating damages).
See, e.g., Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 11-12 (Mass. 1990); see also supra
note 144 and accompanying text.
Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 424 (Fla. 1993); Smith, 513 A.2d at 348; Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 924-25.
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of Special Appeals of Maryland found the calculation of damages impossible and thus fatal to the plaintiff's claim, as the comparison
model, weighing nonexistence versus life in an impaired state, does
not provide a standard for quantifying the value of the injury. 169
E.

How the Court of Appeals of Maryland Decided the Matter

The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the
lower court, yet determined ·the matter on the premise that life does
not constitute a legal injury.170 The court's discussion of wrongful
life, including wrongful conception and wrongful birth, begins by classifying the tort action at issue, reviewing related causes of action, and
examining the Maryland case law that supports them. 171 Building a
foundation for the holding, the court of appeals drew attention to the
narrow language of Jones, which described the injury to the parents of
a healthy child as the costs attendant with raising a child, not the child
itself. 172 Further, the court distinguished the instant case from Reed,
noting that in wrongful birth claims parents claim injuries of emotional distress and child-raising expenses resulting from a medical
provider's negligence;173 whereas, in this matter the defendant did
not cause plaintiff's injury.174
Continuing to frame its rationale, the court of appeals looked to
two of the broad bases that sister jurisdictions have endorsed to invalidate wrongful life claims: 1) that the damage calculation is too complex; and 2) that the philosophical imponderable tied to the
determination of whether an i~ury exists allows for varied results
when left to the fact finder for resolution. 175 Further exploring these
considerations, the court outlined the inadequacy of a damage rubric
that purports to restore plaintiffs to the condition they would have
experienced but for the claimed negligence when confronted with a
169. Kassama, 136 Md. App. at 675, 767 A.2d at 369.
170. Kassama v. Magat, 368 Md. 113, 149, 792 A.2d 1102, 1123-24 (2002); if.
Kassama v. Magat, 136 Md. App. 637, 675, 767 A.2d 348, 369 (2001) (invalidating a claim for wrongful life because of an inability to calculate
damages).
171. Kassama, 368 Md. at 134-37, 792 A.2d at 1114-16. The Maryland cases considered by the court in determining the wrongful life claim included Reed v.
Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 630 A.2d 1145 (1993) (validating a cause of action for wrongful birth); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429
(1984) (recognizing claim for wrongful conception based on negligent sterilization procedure); and Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417,79 A.2d 550
(1951) (vesting a postnatal claim in both the child and parent for the negligent infliction of prenatal injuries).
172. Kassama, 368 Md. at 136, 792 A.2d at 1116; see also Jones v. Malinowski, 299
Md. 257, 270, 473 A.2d 429, 435-36 (1984).
173. Kassama, 368 Md. at 137, 792 A.2d at 1116.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 138, 792 A.2d at 1117.
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comparison between life and nonexistence. 176 More critical still, the
court of appeals emphasized the inability of many jurisdictions to find
a common law or statutory basis to recognize life as an injury. 177
Of those states that have addressed the wrongful life issue through
case law, two states' opinions figured prominently in Maryland's determination of the matter. 178 The Court of Appeals of Maryland pointed
out Arizona's holding in Walker by Pizano v. Mart,179 which invalidated
wrongful life from a fetal rights perspective, and New Hampshire's
holding in Smith v. Cote,180 which discussed the public policy arguments against recognizing wrongful life. 181 The Supreme Court of Arizona reasoned that while the physician's duty of care extended to the
fetus, the fetus did not have a right to be born or the ability to determine matters related to birth. 182 As such, "any wrong ... [committed
is] a wrong to the parents, not the fetus."183
The Court of Appeals of Maryland also noted New Hampshire's elucidation of several public policy arguments against recognizing wrongful life in Smith v. Cote. 184 In that case, the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire considered whether the judiciary was competent to decide
the value of life, determining that courts should not get involved in
deciding the worth of a person's life. 185 Further, the court feared validating wrongful life claims would: "disparage the dignity of the disabled," and that the "subjective and intensely personal notions as to
the intangible value of life" considered by juries would create disparate outcomes. 186
Turning to the minority states-California, Washington and New
Jersey-the Court of Appeals of Maryland scrutinized the reasoning
by which these states validated a limited cause of action for wrongful
life. 187 The court found the determination of damages significant, to
the extent that each of the minority jurisdictions agreed with the majority position that a general damage award was impossible to recognize. 188 This commonality supports Maryland's holding - not to
176. See id. at 138-40, 792 A.2d at 1117-18 (recounting the treatment of a wrongfullife claim and inability to award damages by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (NJ. 1967)).
177. See Kassama, 368 Md. at 140, 792 A.2d at 1118.
178. See id. at 142-43, 792 A.2d at 1120.
179. 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990).
180. 513 A.2d 341, 352-54 (N.H. 1986).
181. See Kassama, 368 Md. at 142-43, 792 A.2d at 1120.
182. Walker by Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 739-40 (Ariz. 1990).
183. Id. at 740. In this context, the injury resulting from the alleged wrong is
"the inability of the parents to terminate the pregnancy which, in turn, resulted in the child being born." Kassama, 368 Md. at 143, 792 A.2d at 1120.
184. Kassama, 368 Md. at 143, 792 A.2d at 1120 (citing Smith, 513 A.2d at 35254).
185. Smith, 513 A.2d at 355.
186. Id.
187. Kassama, 368 Md. at 144-48, 792 A.2d at 1120-23.
188. Id. at 148, 792 A.2d at 1123.
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recognize wrongful life claims - in as much as the accord unifies all
jurisdictions and enables the court to characterize the distinction between the positions as whether legal reasoning or emotion serves as
the basis for judgment. 189 The Court of Appeals of Maryland went on
to state that injury cannot be predicated on emotion; instead, finding
an injury requires a reasoned basis, without which, a determination of
damages becomes moot. 190 Thus presented, the court echoed the
criticisms l9l of sister jurisdictions such as Arizona l92 and New Hampshire l93 and held that "for the purposes of tort law, an impaired life is
not worse than non-life, and, for that reason, life is not, and cannot be,
an injury."194

IV.

ANALYSIS

A.

Maryland Should Have Recognized the Wrongful Life Cause of Action

The Maryland judiciary, drawing support from the statutory scheme
and common law, should have recognized the wrongful life cause of
action, at least in limited circumstances. The cause of action arising
from the same set of facts, yet owned by the parents,195 should inure
to the child when the parents are not available to sue. 196 Furthermore, recognition of the child's wrongful life claim would alleviate
the financial burden the child is faced with in terms of the cost of lifelong medical care and maintenance.

B.

lVhy the Court Should Have Recognized the Wrongful Life Cause of
Action

Recognition of the wrongful life cause of action would satisfY the
social aims of the tort system, remedy statutory pitfalls, and meet the
ever-increasing legal obligations concomitant with advancements in
genetic counseling and medical technology. "Tort recovery is designed, inter alia, to prevent an injured party from becoming destitute
and a burden upon innocent third parties."197 This policy necessarily
189. See id.
190. See Kassama, 368 Md. at 148, 792 A.2d at 1123.
191. See Kassama, 368 Md. at 144, 792 A.2d at 1120. Arizona, New Hampshire
and other states criticized the minority position for permitting the child to
recover special damages but not general damages-placing significance on
emotional notions of fairness rather than logic. Id.
192. The Supreme Court of Arizona invalidated the wrongful life cause of action
in Walker fry Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 741 (Ariz. 1990).
193. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire invalidated wrongful life claims in
Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 355 (N.H. 1986).
194. Id. at 148, 792 A.2d at 1123.
195. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
196. See Tuprin, 643 P.2d at 965; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 762; Harbeson v. ParkeDavis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983).
197. Pepper v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 111 Md. App. 49, 71, 680 A.2d 532, 543
(1996) .
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demands solvent tortfeasors share in the financial burden resulting
from their negligent conduct. 198 Additionally, as a principle well established in the common law, tort recovery deters negligent
conduct. 199
As demonstrated by the minority jurisdictions, application of the
traditional tort framework results in a valid cause of action for wrongfullife. 20o Where an injury is identifiable, damages may be awarded in
tort to "restore an injured person as nearly as possible to the position
he or she would have been in had the wrong not been done."201 The
award of damages should be limited to those that flow proximately
from the negligent conduct and are readily ascertainable. 202 Though
the award of general damages, encompassing compensation for pain
and suffering, is not amenable to rational determination or "fair, nonspeculative" calculation,203 other types of damages proximately caused
by third party negligence-special damages-are not only readily ascertainable, but regularly awarded in professional malpractice
cases. 204
Recognition of wrongful life as a valid cause of action would remedy
gaps and pitfalls within the existing statutory scheme. 205 At present,
Maryland statutory law obligates parents to provide for destitute adult
children. 206 The primary purpose of this obligation is "to remove
from public support destitute and disabled people whose relatives are
financially able to support them."207 This responsibility, while an obvi198. See id.
199. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 764; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 496.
200. See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 960; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 763; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at
488.
201. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961.
202. See id. at 963-64.
203. [d. The court in Turpin concedes that the fact finder, being human, is not
competent to "determine in any rational or reasoned fashion whether the
plaintiff has in fact suffered an injury in being born impaired rather than
not being born." [d. at 963. Further, the court acknowledges the impossibility of determining the value of general damages in a "fair, nonspeculative manner." [d. Explaining by way of analogy, the court established that
the ability to valuate the difference between an infirm life and nonexistence is not parallel to determining the value of a broken arm, as the latter
is within the realm of human experience and imagination, and the former
is not. [d. at 963-64.
204. [d. at 965. Special damages represent the cost of the child's "present and
~ontinui~g need for such special, extraordinary medical care and trainmg .... [d.
205. See supra Part II.D.
206. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 13-102(b) (1999).
207. Freeburger v. Bichell, 135 Md. App. 680, 692, 763 A.2d 1226, 1232 (2000)
(holding that section 13-102(b) of the Maryland Family Law Article does
not give rise to an independent cause of action in the parent against the
tortfeasor who caused the adult child's disability).
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ous and rightful promotion of family values, holds the potential to
financially ruin a family. 208
Under Jones v. Malinowski,209 parents may only recover damages up
to the age of majority on a claim of wrongful conception. 210 Though
the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized wrongful birth as a valid
cause of action in Reed v. Campagnolo,211 the court did not extend recovery beyond the age of majority.212 Furthermore, only parents may
recover for wrongful birth. 213 In addition, the common law rule of
Freeburger denies a cause of action in tort under section 13-102 (b) of
the Maryland Family Law Article in favor of the caretaker of a destitute disabled person against a third party tortfeasor. 214 Thus, a further concern assuaged by the recognition of a claim for wrongful life
is the need for a parent to be available to bring a wrongful birth cause
of action in order to recover damages and defray the costs of ongoing
medical care. 215 In this vein, the wrongful life cause of action not only
guarantees a mechanism by which the child may allay the extraordinary cost of a lifetime of medical care; the cause of action also protects
the child from parents absconding damages recovered from their own
wrongful birth claim, or who may breach the fiduciary relationship
created therein; or who may simply be unavailable to bring a cause of
action for wrongful birth. 216
Paramount in the discussion of whether or not to recognize a cause
of action for wrongful life is proper allocation of the exorbitant cost of
living for disabled persons. Currently, the common law only provides
for damages to be awarded to the parents. 217 Moreover, these remedies only compensate the injured party until the child obtains the age
of majority, leaving the disabled individual without financial support
as an adult. 218 In the face of lifetime medical care, this inadequacy
exposes the legally obligated family to bankruptcy,219 a second harm
visited upon the family already suffering from the emotional heartache of raising a child with a genetic disorder. A growing uninsured
208. "A 1998 survey conducted by the National Commission on Orphan Diseases
revealed that in nearly half of the cases studied, the existence of a hereditary disorder caused the patient or care-giver relative financial hardship,
due in part to inadequate medical insurance." David T. Morris, Notes and
Comments, Cost Containment and Reproductive Autonomy: Prenatal Genetic
Screening and the American Health Security Act of 1993, 20 AM. J.L.& MED. 295,
298 (1994).
209. 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
210. Id. at 270, 473 A.2d at 435.
211. 332 Md. 226, 630 A.2d 1145 (1993).
212. See id. at 238, 630 A.2d at 1151.
213. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
214. Freeburger, 135 Md. App. at 682-83, 763 A.2d at 1227.
215. See Smith, 513 A.2d at 355.
216. See Walker try Pizano, 790 P.2d at 741.
217. See supra notes 9, 84-87, 215 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
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population 22o further compounds the financial burden left by common law remedies. In addition, public assistance health plans that
sacrifice much needed medical benefits in the name of politics,221 are
not helpful when "persons affected by genetic disease are often
among the class of individuals who ... are least likely to be able to
obtain [medical insurance] ."222 In the event that the parents are unable to provide such care, the child will necessarily become the responsibility of the state. 223
Yet another reason to recognize the wrongful life cause of action
speaks to advancements in genetic counseling and medical technology.224 Increased knowledge of the human genome holds the potential "to isolate and successfully alter the genetic make-up of embryo
cells, thus curing genetic disorders."225 Such capability will likely cause
many jurisdictions in the majority to change position and recognize
modified wrongful life claims, as the causal link between the doctor's
negligence and the child's impairment will be firmly established. 226
Additionally, jurisdictions rejecting the claim due to the impossibility
of calculating damages may likely change position as the impaired life
versus non-life comparison will be replaced with a comparison "between life with a genetic disorder and life without a genetic
disorder. "227
At the same time knowledge increases, so too the standard of care
. owed to patients will increase. 228 Though the same community standard may slow this evolution, the judiciary will not condone class negligence. 229 While many courts acknowledge the potential for scientific
. advancements to impact the current state of the law, few jurisdictions
make more than casual reference to such considerations, and none

220. David T. Morris, Notes and Comments, Cost Containment and Reproductive
Autonomy: Prenatal Genetic Screening and the American Health Security Act of
1993, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 295, 298 (1994).
22l. The Hyde Amendment, 42 U.S.CA section 1396 (West 1992), denies abortion benefits under Medicaid except when the life of the mother is in danger. See also Morris, supra note 220, at 298.
222. Morris, supra note 220, at 298.
223. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
225. Thomas A. Warnock, Scientific Advancements: Will Technology Make the Unpopular Wrongful Birth/Life Causes of Action Extinct?, 19 TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH.
J. 173, 184 (2001).
226. [d.; see also supra note 2l.
227. Warnock, supra note 225, at 184.
228. See id. at 185.
229. See id. "If a community of professionals continues to employ outdated practices, the courts reserve the authority to declare the entire group negligent." [d.
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find such arguments persuasive enough to validate wrongful life
claims. 230
C.

Shortcomings

The greatest obstacle to recognizing a cause of action for wrongful
life lies in the great weight accorded public policy in the resolution of
the issue. 231 The weight of public policy is perhaps most forceful in
those jurisdictions rejecting wrongful life due to the impossibility of
calculating damages; an inability often addressed in metaphysical
terms. 232 The essence of the wrongful life claim touches sacrosanct
tenets of human existence embodied in the common law as the
preciousness of human life. 233 Yet, this policy also bears weakness.
The notion that mere existence carries with it an indeterminate benefit is individually inspired. For there is no benefit when one cannot
conceive, cannot process, cannot comprehend or cannot act to enjoy
one's own existence. 234
A further weakness expressed by some majority jurisdictions is a
readiness to defer decision of the matter to the legislature. 235 Majority jurisdictions ultimately reject wrongful life claims; yet do so as a
conservative course of action begging legislative guidance. 236 Adding
to the weakness of the majority position, lack of uniform rationale and
230. See Elliott, 361 So. 2d at 548; Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 566 (Ga. 1990) (Benham,]., dissenting); Greco, 893
P.2d at 354 (Shearing,]. and Rose,]. concurring and dissenting).
231. See Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 697. The court stated in Siemieniec.
Resting on the belief that human life, no matter how burdened, is,
as a matter of law, always preferable to nonlife, me courts have
been reluctant to find that the infant has sUffered a legally cognizable injury by being born with a congenital or genetic impairment as
opposed to not being born at all.
[d.
232. The Becker court expressed the difficulty of calculating damages as follows:
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have
been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly
to be left to the philosophers and theologians. Surely the law can
assert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view of
the very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has
placed on human life, rather than its absence.
Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812; See also Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla.
1992); Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 697; Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635,
641 (Kan. 1986).
233. See Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 697; Bruggeman, 718 P.2d at 641; see also supra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
234. See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 963.
235. See Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 702; Cowe, 575 N.E.2d at 635; Pitre, 517 So. 2d at
1025.
236. Pitre, 517 So. 2d at 1025. The court stated" [i] n our view, the question is a
matter of public policy. While courts routinely attempt to resolve public
policy issues, some issues are clearly more appropriate for legislative consideration than judicial treatment." [d.
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strong dissents keep the wrongful life issue from finding secure
footing. 237
Not the least of the shortcomings involved with the issue of wrongful life are future considerations, namely advancements in medicine,
genetic engineering, and related fields that compound the pressure
for recognition of the claim. 238 By nature, the judicial system is, in
part, reactive; deciding questions of law derived from events in the
past. Yet, to an extent, the pace at which the judiciary lags behind
scientific advancements can be controlled. 239 "[A]s . . . science
presses forward, researchers and the public must be prepared to grapple with the gamut of ethical, legal, societal, scientific, and medical
issues."24o The wrongful life cause of action presents the judiciary
with the unique opportunity to meet the legal progeny of medical
trends in a timely manner, thus avoiding the pressure of heated
debate. 241

v.

CONCLUSION

The wrongful life cause of action remains in the spotlight of judicial
debate as, one by one,jurisdictions decide whether or not the claim is
valid. 242 Although a significant number of states reject the claim,243
they do so shackled by public policy and in the face of vehement dissents often revealing a narrowly dividedjudiciary.244 Those states representing the minority position validate a limited cause of action. 245
Conceding the difficulty in adequately determining general damages,
minority jurisdictions allow recovery only for special damages, stand237. The following cases adopting the majority position, invalidating wrongful
life claims, include dissenting opinions: Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d
1202 (Colo. 1988); Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398
S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1985); Siemieniec
v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751
S.w.2d 741 (Mo. 1988); Greco v. United States, 893 P.2d 345 (Nev. 1995); Ellis
v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986); Nelson v. KruSen, 678 S.W.2d 918
(Tex. 1984); DurneY v. St. Michael's Hosp., 233 N.w.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
238. See Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 932 (Kilgarlin,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239. See id. (stating "[d]espite the rapidly expanding impact of genetic knowledge upon our society, the law has failed to keep pace . . . . [0] nly by
assuring a doctor's legal accountability can we guard against an abuse of
such power.").
240. Gwen Moulton, Panel Finds in Utero Gene Therapy Pmposal Is Premature, 91].
NAT'L CANCER INsT. 407 (1999).
24l. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 566
(Ga. 1990) (Benham,]., dissenting) ("If we are to maintain the proper balance between law and medicine, we cannot allow the law to be determined
in the laboratory; but we would be derelict in our duty if we failed to take
into consideration developments in the laboratory.").
242. See supra Part ILB.
243. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 230, 237, 239 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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ing on tort principles that recognize the need to defray the extraordinary cost of ongoing medical care and training borne by plaintiffs as a
result of the negligence of a solvent tortfeasor. 246
Maryland's common law and statutory scheme provide for recognition of a limited cause of action for wrongful life. 247 Such a claim
would circumvent the dangers inherent in allowing recovery only to
parents under a wrongful birth cause of action. 248 Additionally, a
wrongful life claim would alleviate the need to separately address a
cause of action for post-majority damages, allowing the child to recover damages not claimed by, or awarded to parents, should they
bring a wrongful birth claim. 249 Furthermore, wrongful life claims
avoid the pitfalls of a statutory scheme that hold the potential to bankrupt already burdened families by obliging them to provide care and
financial support to destitute adult children. 25o Such a claim may also
provide the financial means necessary to avoid state involvement in
the management and care of individuals born into an existence they
can neither afford nor escape. 251 Finally, by recognizing a cause of
action for wrongful life, courts have an opportunity to stem the tide of
legal claims that flow from advances in medicine and genetics. 252
Though the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to recognize a
child plaintiff's claim for wrongful life, the matter remains unsettled.
The court's holding in Kassama v. Magaf 53 side-steps two crucial issues lying at the heart of the wrongful life debate: How will the child's
needs be met when she obtains majority status? And who will meet
these needs? At present, this responsibility lies primarily on the parents. 254 Should the parents be unable to adequately provide for their
disabled child, however, the state will necessarily become involved. 255
Meanwhile, the tortfeasor, whose proven negligence results in liability
only for pre-majority damages,256 is released from an obligation under
tort law to remedy a harm. Contrary to the tort remedy provided by
the court's recognition of wrongful birth claims in Reed v.
246.
247.
248.
249.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I1.D.
See supra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes lOl-02, 206-09 and accompanying text. In the alternative, an
expansion of the Reed holding to allow parents to recover post-majority
damages under a claim of wrongful birth would, in part, remedy the child's
claim.
See supra notes 208-lO and accompanying text.
See supra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
368 Md. 113, 792 A.2d 1102 (2002).
See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
For the purposes of this argument, suppose the parents of a disabled child
successfully brought a wrongful birth claim against the mother's Obstetrician/ Gynecologist.
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Campagnolo,257 however, the harm does not cease upon attainment of
majority status, but rather continues for the life of the child.
Perhaps the solution to this problem calls for an expansion of the
existing common law rules taken from Jones v. Malinowski and Reed,
allowing parents to recover post-majority damages. 258 Yet, this too falls
short of securing the financial resources needed to care for the now
disabled adult in the event that the parents are not able to bring a
wrongful birth claim.
Finally, another tack may yield an answer. The court's holding in
Damasiewicz v. GorSUCh,259 allowing child plaintiffs to recover damages
for prenatal torts, evokes family law arguments that focus on the right
of the child to access the court, relative to the rights of the parents. 260
In this vein, however, circuitous logic may prove fatal, leading the judiciary to again confront a child's claim in the face of a mother's right
to determine matters of pregnancy and birth. 261
T. Brendan Kennedy

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

332 Md. 226, 630 A.2d 1145 (1993); see supra Part II.C.3.
See supra Part II.C.2-3.
197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
See supra Part II.C.l.
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.

